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UNDER THE RIVER AND THROUGH THE COMMON LAW:
ANALYZING THE IMPACTS AND PROPENSITY OF STATE




Hidden beneath the watercourses, running through our country
like natural veins, lies a resource fervently pursued. It is not gold or silver
or a magical elixir. It is the mucky, muddy, silty streambed itself. For he
who owns the streambed owns all it contains.1 Streambed ownership is
not often considered a hot button issue in today’s society. That quickly
changes when one thinks of the impacts such ownership has on routine
practices. Royalties from oil and gas production,2 pollution remediation,3
rights to fish, swim, and boat,4 renewable energy;5 all of these are impli-
cated by the determination of who owns a streambed. Such ownership
issues are determined by the navigability of the stream.6 On the federal
level, navigability law has formed through the development of common law
over much of American history.7 Additionally, since property law is a prod-
uct of the states, each state has developed its own history of common law
* JD Candidate 2021, William & Mary Law School; BS 2017, North Carolina State
University. The author would like to thank her family and friends for their enduring
support and encouragement. Additionally, the author would like to thank her supervisors
at the Pennsylvania Department of Conservation and Natural Resources and the Virginia
Coastal Policy Center for engaging a young law student in thoughtful dialogue that
prompted the topic of this Note.
1 See Rachael Lipinski, The Dividing Line: Applying the Navigability-for-Title Test after
PPL Montana, 91 OR. L. REV. 247, 247 (2012).
2 See Shale Gas and Publicly-Owned Streambeds, PA. DEP’T OF CONSERVATION &NAT. RES.,
https://www.dcnr.pa.gov/Business/StreambedGasLeasing/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma
.cc/KZF8-MP8E] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020) [hereinafter PA Streambed Leasing Policy].
3 See Qianrui Wang et al., Sources and Remediation for Mercury Contamination in
Aquatic Systems—A Literature Review, 131 ENV’T POLLUTION 323, 328 (2004).
4 See Lehigh Falls Fishing Club v. Andrejewski, 735 A.2d 718, 718–19 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).
5 See PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 586–87 (2012) (discussing hydro-
power dams).
6 Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 219–21 (1845).
7 See Lipinksi, supra note 1, at 251–55.
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governing the issue.8 Though navigability law is a product of years of
development, it should not be assumed that it is complete and without
holes of misunderstanding.
The Supreme Court added an additional layer to the federal navi-
gability-for-title test with its holding in PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana
in 2012.9 The navigability-for-title test asserts that the navigability of a
stream or river is determinative of the ownership of the underlying stream-
bed.10 If the watercourse is navigable, streambed ownership belongs to the
state.11 If the watercourse is non-navigable, streambed ownership belongs
to the riparian owners to the midpoint of the watercourse.12 The Court’s
addition of the segmented approach to determinations of navigability-for-
title, in which navigability of a stream is determined through factual
analysis of specific segments of the stream rather than the stream as a
whole, came as some surprise.13 Since then, scholars and practitioners
alike have debated the application of the segment-by-segment approach
to the thirteen original colonies due to the Court’s reliance on the equal
footing doctrine in reaching its holding.14 The equal footing doctrine was
established in the late 1700s in order to create a process for admitting
new states into the Union that would put them in a similar legal position
as the original states.15 The Court’s use of this doctrine in its analysis in
PPL Montana spurred further questions of applicability of the law to
every state.16
State common law differs regarding tests for navigability-for-title,
and some states do not follow the segmented approach.17 However, due to
the underlying principles of the equal footing doctrine, the historic promul-
gation of federal navigability standards by states, and the characteristics
of the natural resources at issue, the federal segment-by-segment approach
8 See infra notes 81–105 and accompanying text.
9 PPL Montana, 565 U.S. at 593, 597.
10 Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines:
Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PA. ST. ENV’T L. REV.
1, 6–8 (2007).
11 Id. at 7.
12 Id. at 7–8.
13 See Lipinksi, supra note 1, at 267–68.
14 See N.C. Dep’t of Admin. v. Alcoa Power Generating, Inc., 853 F.3d 140, 148 (4th Cir.
2017); Lipinksi, supra note 1, at 269.
15 Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 222 (1845).
16 See Lipinksi, supra note 1, at 270–71.
17 See Douglas C. McElwee & Charles McElwee, State/Private Ownership of Non-Tidal
Streambeds, Banks and Their Substrata in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Virginia, Kentucky, and
West Virginia, 32 ENERGY & MIN. L. INST. 400, 403–27 (2011).
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to navigability-for-title determinations set forth in PPL Montana should
be adopted by all states in the Union. Such a determination would likely
have impacts on natural gas and oil operations, public recreation, and
pollution remediation.
This Note will begin by discussing the history of the federal navi-
gability-for-title test as well as the equal footing doctrine. The Note will
then move into a review of how the Supreme Court applied this test and
doctrine in reaching its decision in PPL Montana and further explain the
new law it created. The next portion of the Note will assert the argument
that all states should adopt the federal navigability-for-title test as
outlined in PPL Montana. This Note will discuss how state law differs from
federal law and then will move into the argument in favor of adoption of
the federal standard. The final portion of the Note will address policy
considerations in the areas of energy production, pollution remediation,
and public rights that are implicated by adoption of the federal standard.
I. RELEVANT COMMON LAW HISTORY
In order to best understand the holding of PPL Montana, a review
of the common law origins and development of the foundations of the
Court’s analysis are necessary. First, this Note will discuss the development
of the navigability-for-title test. Next, this Note will review the equal foot-
ing doctrine. As will be discussed later, these legal principles and frame-
works have implications on the application of the PPL Montana holding.
A. Navigability-for-Title Test
As mentioned, the navigability-for-title test that was utilized by the
Court in its analysis in PPL Montana has been developed through many
years of common law decisions.18 In order to best understand the Court
in PPL Montana, a brief review of the test’s development is important.
In The Daniel Ball, the Supreme Court assessed a steamship’s
compliance with a federal statute.19 This statute, however, would only
apply if the Grand River was determined to be navigable.20 As such, the
majority of the court’s opinion focused on determining the navigability
18 See infra notes 19–42 and accompanying text.
19 The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 558 (1870).
20 Id. at 562.
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of the river.21 In reaching its holding, the Court first rejected the English
common law rule of navigability based on the ebb and flow of the tide of
the watercourse.22 It then established a new test of navigability:
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers
in law which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable
in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used,
in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over
which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the
customary modes of trade and travel on water.23
The Court then employed a factual analysis to determine that the Grand
River was navigable and, therefore, that the relevant statute applied.24
In United States v. State of Utah, the United States entered a
quiet title action against Utah for ownership of the beds of the Green,
Colorado, and Utah rivers.25 Both parties had, or were interested in, con-
tracting with private companies for the exploration and development of
oil and gas in the riverbeds.26 Utah claimed the rivers to be navigable and,
therefore, owned by the state.27 The Court enlisted a special master to
hold hearings and conduct a factual determination of the navigability of
the rivers prior to Utah’s admittance as a state into the Union.28 Based
on these factual findings, the Court held that portions of the rivers were
navigable prior to Utah’s admission into the Union and, therefore, the
riverbeds belonged to the state.29 Other portions of the rivers were non-
navigable, the beds of which belonged to the United States.30 United States
v. Utah was a clear application of the federal standard established in The
Daniel Ball to a case in which the state government and the federal gov-
ernment were both seeking ownership of the beds of a stream or river.31
In United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., Appalachian
Electric was planning to build a hydroelectric dam on the New River in
21 Id. at 562–64.
22 Id. at 563.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 564, 566.
25 United States. v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 71 (1931).
26 Id. at 72.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 72–73.
29 Id. at 89–90.
30 Utah, 283 U.S. at 90.
31 Id. at 76.
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Virginia.32 Whether or not the New River was navigable was imperative
in determining if the dam was subject to federal statutes and licensing
or if the electric company had clear title on the asset.33 Of specific concern
to the Court was the federal government’s interest in the promotion of in-
terstate commerce and the right to regulate such in navigable waters.34
In making its navigability determination, the Court stated that (1) once
a stream or river was determined navigable, it remained navigable;35 (2)
reasonable improvements in the river that make it capable of interstate
commerce could be considered in determining navigability;36 and (3) the
navigable use of the river does not have to be continuous for the river to
be deemed navigable.37
A key distinction occurs in the administration of the federal stan-
dard to cases of navigability for federal regulatory determinations and
navigability for cases of state title ownership.38 In the regulatory cases,
navigability can be determined in the past, present, or even future condi-
tions of the waterway.39 In cases for state title, navigability is determined
at the time the state entered the union.40 Together, these cases form the
basis of the federal navigability-for-title standard established through
common law.41
B. The Equal Footing Doctrine
Understanding of the equal footing doctrine and its history is im-
perative in understanding the Court’s ruling in PPL Montana. The Court
32 United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 398 (1940).
33 Id. at 398, 402–03.
34 Id. at 404–05.
35 Id. at 408.
36 Id. at 409.
37 Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. at 409.
38 Paul Phillips, U.S. Supreme Court Addresses “Equal Footing” Doctrine and Ownership
of Beds and Banks of “Navigable” Rivers, AM. COLL. ENV’T L. (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www
.acoel.org/post/2012/03/28/US-SUPREME-COURT-ADDRESSES-“EQUAL-FOOTING”
-DOCTRINE-AND-OWNERSHIP-OF-BEDS-AND-BANKS-OF-“NAVIGABLE”-RIVERS
.aspx [https://perma.cc/FX8U-T4RS]. Compare United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power
Co., 311 U.S. at 404–05 (1940) (determining navigability for federal regulatory purposes),
with United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 72 (1931) (determining navigability for ownership
between the state and federal government).
39 PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 592 (2012).
40 Id.
41 See id.
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puts great weight on the intent and execution of the doctrine in reaching
its decision.42 Therefore, a brief review of the leading case on the issue is
essential to an effective discussion of why states should adopt the seg-
mented approach to navigability set forth in PPL Montana.
The equal footing doctrine was articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan in 1845.43 According to the
Court, “the [new states] must be admitted to the Union on equal footing
with the rest.”44 When new states joined the Union, the land they were
to occupy was often ceded from an existing state.45 It was the intent of
the Union and the original states that the ceded lands would be used to
create new states and that the Union would hold the ceded lands in trust
until admittance of the new state occurred.46 However, once the new state
was admitted, “the United States shall have fully executed these trusts, the
municipal sovereignty of the new states will be complete, throughout their
respective borders, and they, and the original states, will be upon an equal
footing, in all respects whatever.”47 The United States then transferred
ownership of unclaimed land to the new state upon its formation, ensuring
the same level of sovereignty that the original states enjoyed.48
Originally, the equal footing doctrine was invoked by states to pre-
vent Congress from unfairly treating new states and imposing conditions
on their admission to the Union.49 These conditions stretched beyond
streambed ownership to mandates such as the location of the state capi-
tol.50 In modern times, litigation involving the rights of Native American
tribes to submerged lands on reservations has commonly involved the
equal footing doctrine.51 Since the equal footing doctrine has proven a
valid consideration by courts in reaching their conclusions for these
disputes,52 it is not surprising that the Court in PPL Montana employed
42 Id. at 593–95.
43 Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 216 (1845).
44 Id.
45 Id. at 221–24.
46 Id. at 224.
47 Id.
48 Pollard’s Lessee, 44 U.S. at 224; Dennison A. Butler, Riparian Rights, Navigability, and
the Equal Footing Doctrine in Montana, 38 PUB. LAND & RES. L. REV. 188, 188–89 (2017).
49 Louis Touton, Note, The Property Power, Federalism, and the Equal Footing Doctrine,
80 COLUM. L. REV. 817, 833 (1980).
50 Id. at 833–34.
51 Frank W. DiCastri, Comment, Are All States Really Equal? The “Equal Footing” Doctrine
and Indian Claims to Submerged Lands, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 179, 183–86 (1997).
52 See id.
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a similar analysis when determining the ownership of streambeds for
energy infrastructure purposes.53
II. APPLICATION OF THE NAVIGABILITY-FOR-TITLE TEST IN
PPL MONTANA
The Court’s approach to reasoning in PPL Montana contains a
combination of navigability-in-fact and equal footing doctrine common law
principles.54 With the basic understanding of these common law princi-
ples in mind, the approach of the Court, as well as the resulting implica-
tions, can be more clearly understood.55
In PPL Montana, controversy arose over payments for the use of
hydroelectric dams in the Missouri, Madison, and Clark Fork Rivers in
Montana.56 Montana had historically not asserted a claim to payment from
the use of the riverbeds.57 Instead, PPL Montana had paid rents to the
United States.58 PPL Montana filed suit in an attempt to prevent Montana
from seeking rent payments for the use of the riverbeds.59 Montana coun-
terclaimed, arguing that title belonged to the state under the equal footing
doctrine.60 The trial court ruled in favor of Montana and awarded damages
of nearly $41,000,000.61 The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning
that the river segments at issue were short interruptions of navigability
and that the rivers as a whole were navigable.62 Title, therefore, resided in
the state.63
The United States Supreme Court reversed the state court’s deci-
sion.64 In reaching its holding, the Court set forth the development of com-
mon law for navigability-for-title as well as the equal footing doctrine.65
53 See PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 590–91 (2012).
54 Id. at 593–603.
55 See id.
56 Id. at 586–87.
57 Id. at 587.
58 PPL Montana, 565 U.S. at 587.
59 Montana first asserted its right to receive rents for the facilities when it joined as a
plaintiff in a case brought by parents of Montana school children seeking the rents as part
of the Montana school trust. Though that case was dismissed, it prompted PPL Montana
to file this suit. Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 587–88.
62 Id. at 588.
63 PPL Montana, 565 U.S. at 588.
64 Id. at 605.
65 Id. at 593–603.
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The Court began its analysis by finding error with the state court’s treat-
ment of the river segments.66 According to the Court, navigability of the
river should be determined by analyzing each distinct and discrete seg-
ment’s navigability.67 This has been termed the segment-by-segment ap-
proach.68 In addition to legal analysis of this approach, the Court also set
forth several practical considerations in support of segmented navigabil-
ity determinations.69 These include (1) that the historical grant of beds
of navigable rivers to states was for the purpose of protecting interstate
commerce, something only accomplished on a navigable river;70 (2) that
segments will be easily determined based on changes in the physical con-
ditions of the rivers, especially longer rivers;71 and (3) that the federal
standard’s segmented approach was consistent with private riverbed title
claims that secure ownership of the riverbed for the portion of the
riverbed adjacent to the riparian owner’s property.72
After analyzing other factors of the state court’s analysis, the Court
held that at least some of the river segments at issue were likely non-
navigable, and therefore title to the riverbeds of these segments would
not lie in the state.73 The Court instructed further factual determinations
to be decided on remand.74
III. APPLICABILITY OF THE FEDERAL STANDARD TO THE STATES
Since the Court’s reasoning in PPL Montana was attenuated and
relied heavily on the equal footing doctrine,75 it has spurred controversy
from states over its applicability.76 The thirteen original states believe that
the Court’s holding does not apply to them because the equal footing doc-
trine is directed at states who gained admission to the Union after the revo-
lution and the transfer of property rights that occurred in that process.77
66 Id. at 593.
67 Id. at 593, 597.
68 PPL Montana, 565 U.S. at 596.
69 Id. at 595–96.
70 Id. at 594–95.
71 Id. at 595.
72 Id. at 595–96. These practical considerations, however, have come under fire by some
legal scholars as being irrelevant and ill-founded. Lipinski, supra note 1, at 269.
73 PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 597, 599–600 (2012).
74 Id. at 600.
75 See id. at 593–95.
76 N.C. Dep’t of Admin. v. Alcoa Power Generating, Inc., 853 F.3d 140, 148–50 (4th Cir.
2017).
77 Id.
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Because of this, and the fact that property law is a creature of state law,78
the Court’s holding in PPL Montana has not been readily adopted by the
states.79 This section of the Note will begin by addressing the current
variety of state law concerning the navigability-for-title test. Next, the
Note will present an argument for the adoption of the segmented approach
to navigability-for-title determinations, as outlined in PPL Montana, by
all states.
A. Variety of Navigability-for-Title Tests in State Common Law
Since navigability is a function of property law and property law
is the domain of the individual states, navigability-for-title tests vary
from state to state.80 Some states, such as Virginia, have developed their
tests through a combination of state statute and common law.81 Other
states, such as Pennsylvania, have developed their test primarily through
common law.82
Additionally, states differ to the extent their tests are aligned with
the federal standard.83 This is evidenced most clearly through the reason-
ing of state courts in reaching their holdings in individual cases.84 Some
states, such as Pennsylvania, have adhered rather closely to federal tests.85
Other states have done this to a much lesser degree.86
Pennsylvania and Virginia serve as illustrative examples of both
of these points.
1. Pennsylvania
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision in Cleveland & P.R.
Co. v. Pittsburgh Coal Co. established the navigability test under Penn-
sylvania state law.87 This test follows the pre–PPL Montana federal test
of navigability-in-fact and determines navigability based on a stream’s
“ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade or
78 Loving v. Alexander, 745 F.2d 861, 868 (4th Cir. 1984).
79 See Alcoa, 853 F.3d at 148–50.
80 McElwee & McElwee, supra note 17, at 401–02.
81 Id. at 409–14.
82 Id. at 403–07.
83 Id. at 401–03.
84 See infra notes 88–102 and accompanying text.
85 See infra notes 88–95 and accompanying text.
86 See infra notes 97–102 and accompanying text.
87 Cleveland & P.R. Co. v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 176 A. 7, 8–10 (Pa. 1935).
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travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel
on water.”88
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed navigability again
in Lehigh Falls Fishing Club v. Andrejewski.89 In Lehigh Falls, the de-
termination of an exclusive fishing right existing in the riparian land-
owner was contingent upon the navigability of the Lehigh River.90 The
Court analyzed precedent that proved the Lehigh River navigable and
held that an exclusive fishing right did not exist in the riparian land-
owner.91 The appellant contended that the portion of the river adjacent
to their land was non-navigable and, therefore, a public right to fish did
not exist in that portion of the river.92 The court rejected this theory and
stated “[r]ivers are not determined to be navigable on a piecemeal basis.
It is clear that once a river is held to be navigable, its entire length is en-
compassed.”93 However, no citation to any precedent or scholarship was
used in rejecting the segmented approach to navigability determinations.94
Additionally, no cases since have cited this language in Lehigh Falls.95
2. Virginia
Unlike Pennsylvania and many other states, Virginia’s case law
on navigability is unclear and difficult to interpret.96 A litany of case law
between 1805 and 1996 attempted to clarify Virginia’s definition of navi-
gability as well as whether any statutes preempted existing case law.97
Additionally, until the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision in Kraft v. Burr
in 1996, the definition of “navigability” was not articulated well by the
court and was extremely unclear.98 For example, in Commonwealth v.
Morgan, the Virginia Supreme Court held that a transfer of rights to the
bed of Carter Cove was valid but did not determine whether the Cove
was navigable or not.99 In Kraft v. Burr, the same court determined that
88 Id. at 9 (quoting The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870)).
89 Lehigh Falls Fishing Club v. Andrejewski, 735 A.2d 718, 719 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).
90 Id. at 719.
91 Id. at 722.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 See Lehigh Falls Fishing Club, 735 A.2d at 772.
95 See id.
96 McElwee & McElwee, supra note 17, at 409.
97 Id. at 409–13.
98 Id. at 413.
99 Commonwealth v. Morgan, 303 S.E.2d 899, 901–02 (Va.1983).
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a similar transfer of rights to a riverbed was valid for a non-navigable
stream.100 Much of the confusion in Virginia law comes in interpreting
statutes from the late 1700s and early 1800s in the context of the preced-
ing English common law and the subsequent Virginia common law.101
The finer details of these relationships are beyond the scope of this Note’s
discussion, but still function well as an illustration of how Virginia law
incorporates different considerations than federal navigability law.102
As the examples of Pennsylvania and Virginia illustrate, disparity
exists amongst the navigability tests of the states, even among those of
the original colonies.103 Therefore, changes in the federal standard cre-
ated by PPL Montana would have varying effects on state law navigabil-
ity tests.104
B. Argument in Favor of National Applicability
A large variety exists between navigability law of the several
states.105 There are also clear differences between state and federal law.106
The applicability of the federal standard to all states could solve many
problems of clarity that plague the common law of the states. Given the
Court’s reasoning and use of the equal footing doctrine in PPL Montana,107
it seems that the segmented approach is applicable in federal court but
may not be in state court if state law has not promulgated that portion
of the navigability-for-title test.108 Therefore, in order for the test to gain
nationwide applicability, each state would need to choose to adopt the seg-
mented approach for navigability determinations.
The segmented approach to navigability determinations should
apply to all states in the union. States should readily adopt the standard
because (1) the underlying purpose of the equal footing doctrine supports
100 Kraft v. Burr, 476 S.E.2d 714, 717 (Va. 1996); see also Boerner v. McCallister, 89
S.E.2d 23, 26–27 (Va. 1955).
101 McElwee & McElwee, supra note 17, at 414. See also VA. CODE ANN. § 28.2-1200 (2019).
102 For further analysis of these issues, see McElwee & McElwee, supra note 17, at 409–14.
103 See supra notes 88–103 and accompanying text.
104 While this Note presents arguments for general state adoption of the federal standard,
it is recognized that individualized impacts on each state could differ due to the variances
in state navigability law.
105 McElwee & McElwee, supra note 17, at 403–27.
106 Id. at 401–03.
107 PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 557, 593–603 (2012).
108 See N.C. Dep’t of Admin. v. Alcoa Power Generating, Inc., 853 F.3d 140, 146–50 (4th
Cir. 2017).
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a nationwide application of the test; (2) states, even some original states,
have adopted and applied the federal standard of navigability long before
the PPL Montana holding; and (3) continuity of law across jurisdictional
boundaries would more closely resemble the characteristics of the re-
sources to which it is applied and would promote effective and predictive
use of said resources.
1. Premise of the Equal Footing Doctrine
States, scholars, and practitioners have argued that the segmented
approach to navigability-for-title determinations set forth in PPL Montana
should not apply to the thirteen original states.109 They believe the equal
footing doctrine, which served as the backbone of the Court’s reasoning
for the segmented approach,110 does not apply to the original states.111
It is precisely because the Court used the equal footing doctrine
in its reasoning for establishing the segmented approach to navigability
determinations that the test should apply to all states in the Union.112 The
purpose of the equal footing doctrine was to ensure states newly admitted
to the Union were given the same amount of power as those that formed
the Union after the Revolution.113 All states were to be treated equally
with no individual state receiving preference or asserting power over
another.114 In order to keep to the principles of the doctrine, the seg-
mented approach should be applied, without discrimination, to all states.
So far, the issue of the equal footing doctrine’s influence on the
original states has come up in the lower courts on one occasion. In Alcoa,
the state of North Carolina challenged Alcoa Power Generating’s owner-
ship of a portion of the Yadkin River.115 The district court had ruled in
favor of Alcoa and North Carolina appealed.116 The Fourth Circuit heard
the case and was asked to determine (1) whether navigability was a federal
question in terms of subject matter jurisdiction,117 and (2) whether the
lower court had accurately determined navigability.118 The court rejected
109 Id. at 148; Lipinksi, supra note 1, at 269.
110 PPL Montana, 65 U.S. at 593–603.
111 Alcoa, 853 F.3d at 148; Lipinksi, supra note 1, at 269.
112 See PPL Montana, 565 U.S. at 593–94.
113 Alcoa, 853 F.3d at 148.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 143–44.
116 Id. at 144.
117 Id. at 146.
118 Alcoa, 853 F.3d at 146.
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the argument that the Supreme Court’s only basis for federal jurisdiction
in PPL Montana was based on the Court’s use of the equal footing doctrine
and that such doctrine would not apply to the thirteen original states.119
In its reasoning, the Fourth Circuit interpreted federal precedent as well
as PPL Montana to find that the source of federal jurisdiction for naviga-
bility determinations lied in the issue of separation of powers between
the states and the United States that occurred at the time of the state’s
creation.120 In particular, the Fourth Circuit noted “its position is irrecon-
cilable with the tenets of the Equal Footing Doctrine itself, which was
designed to ensure that the new States enter the Union with ‘the same
rights . . . as the original states.’”121
It is clear from both the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Alcoa and
the underlying principles of the equal footing doctrine that states have
no position in using the equal footing doctrine as a justification for re-
jecting the Court’s segmented approach to navigability-for-title determi-
nations.122 In fact, the equal footing doctrine line of reasoning should
encourage states’ adoption of the segmented approach.
2. Promulgation of Federal Standard
States have been reluctant to accept that the segmented approach
to navigability-for-title determinations set forth in PPL Montana is
applicable to all states in the Union.123 Alternatively, states would prefer
to utilize their own tests established through state common law.124
Many states have looked to federal standards and tests in adopt-
ing state common law principles to guide navigability determinations.125
In doing so, these states, which include many of the original states, have
promulgated the federal standards either piecemeal or in their en-
tirety.126 As discussed above, Pennsylvania serves as one example of a
state that has promulgated federal navigability standards in their en-
tirety.127 Other states, such as Virginia, have developed a hybrid version
119 Id. at 148–50.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 149 (quoting Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 230 (1845)).
122 Id. at 148–50. See also supra notes 43–54 and accompanying text.
123 Alcoa, 853 F.3d at 148.
124 Id.
125 Boerner v. McCallister, 89 S.E.2d 23, 26–27 (Va. 1995); McElwee & McElwee supra
note 17, at 403–27.
126 McElwee & McElwee supra note 17, at 403–27.
127 See supra notes 88–96 and accompanying text.
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of state navigability law that includes some aspects of the federal stan-
dard.128 These federal influences were further disseminated when states
such as Kentucky and West Virginia were annexed out of the state of
Virginia and utilized Virginia common law as a basis for their own.129
Since state adoption of federal standards has occurred at least in
part, federal courts applying navigability-for-title tests over ownership
issues within a state may justify applying the federal standards for naviga-
bility determinations. With federal courts applying federal law and state
courts applying state law to the same issue, a jurisdictional difference that
has been deemed unacceptable would occur.130 Therefore, state adoption
of the federal segmented approach to navigability-in-fact determinations
would resolve an untenable paradigm of jurisdictional disparity.
3. Predictability of Resource Use
A common argument brought by opponents of the segmented ap-
proach lies in its applicability.131 Opponents assert that rivers and streams
are contiguous bodies of water that cannot be dissected in ways that make
a segmented approach to navigability determinations efficient or effec-
tive.132 Because of this, viewing the river or stream as a whole in making
navigability-for-title determinations is preferable in many instances.133
Furthermore, they believe states are in the best position to determine
whether or not a segmented approach would be effective in their jurisdic-
tion based on the physical properties of the waterways.134
While there is no doubt that rivers and streams are unique in that
they are contiguous, it is this precise characteristic that makes national
application of the federal standard preferable. Many rivers traverse
jurisdictional boundaries.135 As discussed above, states’ navigability tests
differ greatly.136 If each jurisdiction was free to impose their own standard
on navigability-for-title determinations, use management of the river and
the riverbeds would be extremely challenging.137 A standard that has the
128 See supra notes 97–103 and accompanying text.
129 McElwee & McElwee, supra note 17, at 414–27.
130 N.C. Dep’t of Admin. v. Alcoa Power Generating, Inc., 853 F.3d 140, 149 (4th Cir. 2017).




135 S. Whittmore Boggs, Problems of Water-Boundary Definition: Median Lines and Inter-
national Boundaries Through Territorial Waters, 27 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 445, 445 (1937).
136 See supra notes 88–103 and accompanying text.
137 David Tickner et al., Managing Rivers for Multiple Benefits—A Coherent Approach to
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ability to add continuity to the law, especially in governance of a multi-
jurisdictional resource, should be readily adopted. The use of such standard
could aid in the management and use of the river or stream by adding a
level of predictability to an area of law that has otherwise been largely
vague and unclear.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF NATIONAL APPLICABILITY OF THE
FEDERAL STANDARD
Streambed ownership, and the determination thereof, impacts many
facets of policy creation and economic markets.138 In making determina-
tions of ownership, it is important to recognize the rights, and covenants
that follow, which will be impacted.
A. Energy Production
As noted in many of the aforementioned cases, streambed owner-
ship has a substantial interplay with the production and transportation
of energy.139 Of great prominence is the distribution of oil and gas royal-
ties.140 As energy companies extract these resources from beneath streams
and rivers, payment in the form of royalties is given to the owners of land
in which the minerals lie.141 Many states have streambed leasing policies
Research, Policy and Planning, FRONTIERS ENV’T. SCI. 1 (2017) (explaining how rivers
need to be managed comprehensively to achieve multiple benefits); The River Management
Society, RIVERMGMT.SOC’Y, https://www.river-management.org/about-us [https://perma
.cc/FF6V-NVDA] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020) (stating the organization’s promotion of “holis-
tic river management”). See also Scott Dance, Maryland Gov. Hogan Seeks Lawsuit Against
Pennsylvania, EPA over Lagging Chesapeake Bay Cleanup Efforts, BALT. SUN (Jan. 8,
2020), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/environment/bs-md-chesapeake-epa-enforce
ment-lawsuit-20200108-td2bhcbkkvanvdwo4azqvv6mey-story.html [https://perma.cc/DT
88-EPK7] (illustrating the potential unrest caused by unclear expectations of resource
management amongst states); Wallace McKelvey, Is Pennsylvania the ‘Broken’ Link When
it Comes to Curbing Water Pollution?, PENNLIVE (May 29, 2019), https://www.pennlive
.com/news/2019/05/is-pennsylvania-the-broken-link-when-it-comes-to-curbing-water-pol
lution.html [https://perma.cc/985J-L6C4] (illustrating how a resource needs to be managed
consistently across jurisdictional boundaries).
138 See infra notes 140–58 and accompanying text.
139 PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 586–89 (2012) (factual issue involved
royalties from hydropower); United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377,
398 (1940) (factual issue involved a hydroelectric dam); N.C. Dep’t of Admin. v. Alcoa
Power Generating, Inc., 853 F.3d 140, 144–45 (4th Cir. 2017) (factual issue involved
power generation).
140 PPL Montana, 565 U.S. at 586–89.
141 See Mary Cusick and Amy Sisk, Royalties: Why Some Strike it Rich in the Natural Gas
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that articulate which streams and rivers are owned by the state, how to
require approval for drilling under these waterways, and instructions on
how to execute payment of royalties.142 Because the segmented approach
would make a greater number of navigability determinations on any
given stream or river, there is a chance that states could have ownership
to less of the stream beds than previously believed and private ownership
would increase. Altering the amount of submerged lands the state claims
ownership to could ultimately decrease the amount of royalties it is able to
collect from energy producers.143 On the other hand, this would disperse
royalty income to a greater number of riparian owners, resulting in a more
equitable outcome aligned with the tradition of private property rights.144
B. Pollution Remediation
Another interesting policy implication occurs in the remediation
of pollution. Some pollutants, such as mercury, have a remediation best
management practice that requires them to be left and contained in place
for purification through natural processes.145 In the case of water pollu-
tion, this results in the owner of the streambeds acquiring ownership of
the pollutant.146 If the segmented approach to navigability determinations
is adopted in a state that did not previously have it, the navigability-for-
title determinations of certain segments of the stream could result in a
transfer of title of pollutants.147 If ownership of the streambed were to
transfer from the state to a private riparian owner, for example, would the
remediation responsibility of the contained pollutant also transfer? The
Patch, and Others Strike Out, STATEIMPACT PA. (Feb. 28, 2018), https://stateimpact.npr
.org/pennsylvania/2018/02/28/why-some-strike-it-rich-in-the-gas-patch-and-others-strike
-out/ [https://perma.cc/W97E-AWEE].
142 PA Streambed Leasing Policy, supra note 2; Subaqueous Guidelines, VA. MARINE RES.
COMM’N, https://mrc.virginia.gov/regulations/subaqueous_guidelines.shtm [https://perma
.cc/3WZX-KYAC] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020).
143 See PA Streambed Leasing Policy, supra note 2.
144 See Jon Hurdle, Court to Decide if Nearly $400 Million in State Oil and Gas Bonuses
Fund Conservation, STATEIMPACT PA. (July 4, 2017), https://stateimpact.npr.org/penn
sylvania/2017/07/04/advocate-says-state-should-use-oil-gas-lease-revenue-to-fund-con
servation/ [https://perma.cc/F2W5-MJJ7] (serving as an example of how royalties left to
the state may not always be spent in a way that directly benefits the natural resource).
145 Wang et al., supra note 3, at 330–31; PAUL M. RANDALL, EPA, MANAGEMENT OF MER-
CURY POLLUTION IN SEDIMENTS: RESEARCH, OBSERVATIONS, AND LESSONS LEARNED 1–6
(Jan. 27, 2006).
146 See RANDALL, supra note 145, at 1–6.
147 See id.
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answer to this question is beyond the scope of this Note, as it would require
more analysis than space allows. However, if it is assumed the answer to
the above question is “yes” and such situation were to arise, there are
means of addressing this outside of the legal realm. Both the federal gov-
ernment and many state governments have grant funding and remediation
programs in place to assist individuals with pollution remediation.148
Additionally, in the case of mercury, some of these pollutants require no
or limited affirmative action on behalf of the owner of the streambed for
remediation efforts.149 While states are inundated with pollution remedi-
ation needs across great geographical areas, individual property owners
may serve as a more motivated and consistent proponent of remediation
efforts.150 This is all to say, though there may be undesirable implications
of a segmented approach to navigability determinations, there are policy
approaches that can limit these unfortunate instances while still promot-
ing the numerous benefits of the segmented approach.
C. Public Rights
Perhaps of great concern to state legislatures and agencies is how
a change in ownership of a streambed, due to adoption of the segmented
approach or otherwise, would impact the rights of the public. A prime ex-
ample of a public rights impact comes in the form of public recreation.151
148 Cleanup Grants and Funding, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/cleanups/cleanup-grants-and
-funding [https://perma.cc/3YTD-YJTH] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020); Grants, Loans and
Rebates, PA. DEP’T ENV’T PROT., https://www.dep.pa.gov/Citizens/GrantsLoansRebates
/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/WYF9-BUD3] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020); Remedi-
ation Programs, VA.DEP’T ENV’T QUALITY, https://www.deq.virginia.gov/Programs/Land
ProtectionRevitalization/RemediationProgram.aspx [https://perma.cc/428T-EVQG] (last
visited Nov. 24, 2020).
149 Wang et al., supra note 3, at 328–31. For examples of current remediation efforts, see
Chelsea Church, Remediation to Remove Mercury from South River Banks Heads into
Final Stretch, WHSV (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.whsv.com/content/news/South-River-re
mediation-heads-into-final-stretch-564122941.html [https://perma.cc/8V7Y-4NNQ]; Sarah
Rankin, DuPont to Pay $50M Over Mercury-Contaminated Virginia Rivers, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Dec. 15, 2016), https://apnews.com/be362cbf710341c2b84d975906066e4c [https://
perma.cc/375S-N9T8].
150 Final 2018 305(b)/303(d) Water Quality Assessment Integrated Report, VA. DEP’T ENV’T
QUALITY, https://www.deq.virginia.gov/Programs/Water/WaterQualityInformationTMDLs
/WaterQualityAssessments/2018305(b)303(d)IntegratedReport.aspx [https://perma.cc/JL
T9-GVQW] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020). The EPA compiled an 88-page list of impaired
waters in Virginia still in need of remediation plans.
151 See Nathan Damweber, PPL Montana v. Montana: From Settlers to Settled Expectations,
40 ENV’T L.Q. 163, 187–93 (2013).
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When the state owns a streambed, recreational uses that involve the
streambed are allowed by any member of the public, subject to the state’s
regulation.152 Recreational uses of this type could include fishing (where
the participant wades out into the stream or river) or kayaking and
canoeing (where participants may need access to the banks of the stream
beneath low-water mark for launching and docking of boats).153 When the
streambed is not owned by the state, such recreational activity is consid-
ered a trespass on the land of the riparian owner.154 States’ concern for a
segmented approach lies not only with the loss of the public right to rec-
reation, but also with the management of a resource that may not wholly
belong to them.155 This alteration in management could have further im-
pacts on the recreational use of the public.156 However, these are concerns
that could easily be mitigated with public access points from state-owned
lands or servitudes, such as easements, with willing riparian owners.157
Additionally, state legislatures have recognized the potential for such
conflicts and have worked to resolve navigability-for-title issues that im-
pact public rights through the legislative and administrative processes.158
This suggests that a change to the segmented approach for navigability
152 Lehigh Falls Fishing Club v. Andrejewski, 735 A.2d 718, 719–20 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999);
Boerner v. McCallister, 89 S.E.2d 23, 24–25 (Va. 1955).
153 See Lehigh Falls, 735 A.2d at 719–20; Boerner, 89 S.E.2d at 24–25.
154 Lehigh Falls, 735 A.2d at 719–20; Boerner, 89 S.E.2d at 24–25. See also Hill v. Warsewa,
No. 18-cv-01710-KMT, 2020 WL 1443594, at *1–4 (D. Colo. Mar. 25, 2020) (dismissed on
procedural grounds); Complaint at 60–65, Hill v. Warsewa (No. 18-cv-01710-KMT) 2020
WL 1443594, at *1–4 (D. Colo. Mar. 25, 2020); Jason Blevins, Who Owns the Bottom of
the River? Lawsuit Pitting Fisherman Against Landowner on the Arkansas River Could
Answer the Question, DENVER POST (Feb. 3, 2018), https://www.denverpost.com/2018
/02/03/akansas-river-ownership-roger-hill-mark-warsewa/ [https:// perma.cc/5HQ6-827V].
155 Tickner et al., supra note 137, at 1 (explaining how rivers need to be managed com-
prehensively to achieve multiple benefits).
156 See id.
157 See Brett French, FWP Proposes New Boat Launch at Controversial Boulder River
Site, BILLINGS GAZETTE (Jan. 6, 2016), https://billingsgazette.com/lifestyles/recreation
/fwp-proposes-new-boat-launch-at-controversial-boulder-river-site/article_0e66444b-3c3f
-5f39-bd0c-ac23f174a6bb.html [https://perma.cc/CBN5-6LPQ]; David McNair, No Trespas-
sing: Local Angler Loses Fight for Virginia River Rights, HOOK (Oct. 22, 2012), http://
www.readthehook.com/108488/no-trespassing-local-anglers-looses-fight-virginia-river
-rights [https://perma.cc/4ATD-GFJU].
158 SB 880, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2013) (brought by Senator Deeds to clarify
public recreation rights on nontidal rivers in Virginia); Five-Year Plan FY 2021–2025,
ARIZ.NAVIGABLESTREAMADJUDICATIONCOMM’N, http://www.ansac.az.gov/ [https://perma
.cc/4F4W-34SJ] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020). But see Hadley Barndollar, Maine AG’s Office:
Submerged Lands Bill is Unconstitutional, SEACOASTONLINE (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www
.seacoastonline.com/news/20190313/maine-ags-office-submerged-lands-bill-is-unconstitu
tional [https://perma.cc/L986-FMZB].
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determinations will have no greater negative impact on public recreation
than the current approach.
While policy implications of a changed approach in navigability
determinations may seem problematic at first glance, it is important to
remember that the issues that may occur on a micro scale are likely worth
the benefits gained on the macro level.
CONCLUSION
The determination of streambed ownership can have far-reaching
consequences. Because of this, the process of determining who owns a
streambed should garner much attention. In PPL Montana, the Supreme
Court added the segmented approach to the navigability-for-title test.159
Since the Court’s reasoning was based on the premise of the equal footing
doctrine, the original states claim that the holding does not apply to them
and, therefore, they do not need to adopt the segmented approach to their
navigability-for-title determinations.160
This reasoning is flawed and ill-advised. Rather, the states should
adopt the segmented approach for several reasons. First, the premise and
intent of the equal footing doctrine advocates for equal power amongst the
several states.161 Therefore, the original thirteen states should not be ex-
empt from a federal standard that applies to the other thirty-seven states.
Next, many states have already promulgated the federal navigability-for-
title standard in whole or in part.162 Adoption of this additional component
to the test would provide consistency and aide in federal and state court
application of the test.163 It would also resolve a jurisdictional disparity
and discourage forum shopping.164 Finally, consistency of navigability-
for-title tests amongst all states would aide in management of resources
(rivers and streams) that traverse jurisdictional boundaries.165 Manage-
ment of said resources can be better coordinated and more effective if the
law that applies to them is predictable from state to state.166
Since streambed ownership can have far-reaching impacts, it is
no surprise that a change in the test applied for determination of such
159 PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 593 (2012).
160 See supra notes 110–17 and accompanying text.
161 See supra notes 113–23 and accompanying text.
162 See supra notes 124–30 and accompanying text.
163 See supra notes 124–30 and accompanying text.
164 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
165 See supra notes 132–38 and accompanying text.
166 See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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would also have policy implications. There is the potential for segments
of streams and rivers that have been historically owned by the states to be
given over to private ownership by those whose land borders the water-
way. Most notably, adoption of the segmented approach would impact the
distribution of oil and gas royalties,167 responsibilities of pollution remedia-
tion,168 and rights of the public to recreational use of the resources.169
Overall, these changes would bring benefits to many riparian owners.
Regardless of voluntary adoption of the PPL Montana standard
by states, one thing is certain: the thirty-seven new states will be the
first to navigate the policy implications of the segmented approach to
navigability determinations. Only time, and court precedent, will tell if
their thirteen original comrades will join them on this journey through
uncharted waters.
167 See supra notes 141–45 and accompanying text.
168 See supra notes 146–51 and accompanying text.
169 See supra notes 152–58 and accompanying text.
